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Reality Show: Visions For Post-9/11 States
On April 23, 2003, the humor newspaper The Onion ran the headline „New Fox 
reality TV show to determine ruler of Iraq.“ The faux news report claimed „Descri-
bing the new show as ‘American Idol meets the reconstruction of Afghanistan,’ (Fox 
reality-programming chief Mike) Darnell said ‘Appointed by America’ will feature 
contestants squaring off in a variety of challenges, including a democracy quiz, a 
talent competition, and nation-building activities that will demonstrate their abi-
lity to lead a bombed-out war-ravaged Mideast country.”
Several theories also compete to be the governing vision for Iraq, Afghanistan, 
and all other post-9/11 states. Each has a separate view for how a state can produce 
the most stability, or the least amount of internal conﬂict. One vision , backed by 
the Bush Administration and ideological idealists, calls for an expansion of demo-
cracy and political rights that would enable the people to have full participation 
in elections and the right to take power through institutions selected by popular 
sovereignty. A second vision contends that a strong state is needed to control the 
political and economic spheres, in order to curb violence and provide for the basic 
needs of that country’s people. A third vision claims that governments which re-
spect the civil liberties and economic freedoms of their country’s citizens will be 
able to provide the best way to reduce violence. To determine the best approach 
for the post-9/11 state, each vision will be examined based upon data from prece-
ding decades to determine which factors have provided the greatest reduction in 
conﬂict within a country.
Competing Visions For The Post 9/11 State
The Case For A Participatory State
The export of elections has become a cornerstone of the Bush Administration’s po-
licy. The chief executive of the United States cites success in Afghanistan’s election 
as a reason to pursue a plebiscite in Iraq (White House, 2004b; National Security 
Council, 2005). And even President Bush’s critics, like Senator Ted Kennedy (2005) 
contend that holding elections could represent a „fresh approach.“ 
But there is some recognition among democracy supporters, even in the Bush 
Administration, that more may be needed than simply a vote. Haass (2003) and the 
National Security Council (2005) contend that democracies should be constructed 
based upon the development of a series of checks and balances.
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Several supporters of the participatory vision go on to articulate the need to 
spread such policies to the rest of the Middle East (Kengor, 2004). The National 
Security Council (2005) cites goals of bringing democracy to Lebanon, the Pales-
tinian Territories, Kuwait, Morocco, Jordan and Egypt.
Why would elections and democratization be desirable in Afghanistan, Iraq, 
and the rest of the Middle East? First, members of the Bush Administration (White 
House, 2004a) believe that democracy is an anti-terror weapon. They are convinced 
that Iraqi elections will help defeat the insurgency (White House, 2004b). Those of 
the participatory vision believe in one of the most debated theories of international 
relations scholarship: the Democratic Peace. This argument contends that no two 
democracies have ever gone to war with each other (Gartzke, 2005). While critics 
might point out that this deals with external conﬂict, and not internal conﬂict, 
United States Secretary of State Condoleeza Rice (2005) claims „Democracy is the 
only assurance of lasting peace and security between states, because it is the only 
guarantee of freedom and justice within states.”
Supporters of the democracy promotion plan contend that societies become 
more peaceful when there is a greater chance for the public to participate in the 
institutions that govern them. This is for several reasons, many of which are provi-
ded by the democratic peace theory. First, the people are the ones who suffer the 
greatest when war occurs, whether it is domestic or not. Therefore, if given the 
chance, most people will not opt for the policies that would allow their country 
to be engulfed in a war (Kant, 1795), even an internal war, since they will pay for 
the costs with blood and taxes. Undemocratic leaders, who are the least likely to 
suffer, have no similar compunctions about internal conﬂict, and will wage con-
ﬂict to strengthen their own position, at home or abroad. Second, democracies are 
bound by norms of non-conﬂict, and peaceful means of resolving disputes (Maoz 
and Russett, 1993). The people of a democracy have more than simply the violence 
option; they can petition the parliament, take their opponent to court, campaign to 
put one’s own policies in power, etc. Third, democracies have relatively cumbersome 
structures (Maoz and Russett, 1993). With so many hurdles to circumvent before 
war can emerge within one’s borders, there is more than ample time to ﬁnd for a 
nonviolent resolution to possible hostilities.
Participatory Theory: The more a country allows for public participation, the more 
stable its state and society are.
Political participation can be conceptualized in several different ways. First, how 
much are the citizens of the state allowed to act in the political arena? Can they 
vote? Can they run for ofﬁce? Can they cast ballots in a referendum? Can they 
contribute to candidates? Can they determine the nominees for political ofﬁce? 
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These freedoms are called political rights. The fewer the restrictions on political 
rights, the less likely it is that instability will occur. With more avenues open to 
the population to get involved, choose a candidate that matches their preferences, 
vote on issues affecting them, as well as actually become a part of the governing 
process, support for attacking such a system is likely to diminish. Such a partici-
patory system would have greater legitimacy than one selected by means other 
than the will of the people in a free and fair competition.
Political Rights Hypothesis: An increase in a country’s political rights is more likely 
to lead to a decrease in internal conﬂict.
But participation is not just about increased access to the political system. The in-
put must be meaningful, not a token amount. In other words, a government that 
allows open participation, but does not enable the participants a realistic chance 
of accomplishing policy objectives is unlikely to curb instability. This means that 
a single leader cannot dominate the political process; governing institutions must 
be relatively decentralized to allow those who participate to have a greater say. 
It also means that there must be checks and balances, so that more institutions 
open to the public exist. The elected ofﬁcials are not thwarted by an army of poli-
tical appointees who carry out the wishes of someone else. A politically mobilized 
public that cannot realize their goals because they lack control over meaningful 
institutions is dangerous for a country’s stability. Furthermore, a system where 
public power is somewhat dispersed is less likely to maintain the means by which 
an internal war may be waged.
Democracy Hypothesis: An increase in a country’s public control over governing in-
stitutions is more likely to lead to a decrease in internal conﬂict.
The Case For A Strong State
Critics of democracy have pointed out that a system of competitive elections carries 
over the competition from society, especially if the country is divided along sectarian 
fault lines and has little experience in democracy-building. In budding democratic 
systems, people often have group ties. So politicians attempt to harness votes by 
playing on the basic characteristics of society, exacerbating sectarian tensions (Za-
karia, 2002; Garmong, 2003)1. Mansﬁeld and Snyder (2005) offer the example of 
1 Critics of the Democratic Peace have argued that democratizing states, or semidemocracies, are 
more war prone than democracies or autocracies (Mansﬁeld and Snyder, 2005; Owen, 2005). 
Gartzke (2005) points out that not only are democracies just as likely to ﬁght (just not with 
each other), but also their developing counterparts are just as likely to ﬁght as developing 
dictatorships are.
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Central Africa, where Rwanda and Burundi experienced electoral competition, then 
genocide, after being pressured to democratize by international agencies.
In addition to the divisive sectarian campaigns in democratizing societies, the-
re is an added component of the majoritarian outcomes of such elections, which 
produces an „all-or-nothing“ result (Zakaria, 1997; Garmong, 2003). Numerous 
examples exist from Adolf Hitler to Hugo Chavez, Vladimir Putin and Aleksander 
Lukashenko of Belarus) of democratically elected leaders who behaved in an un-
democratic fashion (Zakaria, 1997; 2002; 2003; 2005). Signs are becoming evident 
that Iraq is rapidly heading toward sectarian politics (Basham, 2003) as well as 
majoritariainism (Diamond, 2005).
Even the Bush Administration may be tiring of their democratic experiment in 
the Middle East. Democratic societies do not seem to be providing the anti-terro-
rist outcomes the Americans had expected, souring their earlier optimism on de-
mocratization policies in the Middle East (Haass, 2003; Slavin, 2005; Loven, 2006). 
According to a report (Pelofsky, 2006) „The New York Times . . . quoted an unnamed 
military affairs expert who was briefed at the White House last month as saying 
senior administration ofﬁcials acknowledged that they are ‘considering alternatives 
other than democracy’ in Iraq, which the White House denied.“2 
The Need For A Strongman
It may seem paradoxical for a coalition of democratic countries, led by one so 
committed to democracy promotion, to consider the possibility of installing an au-
thoritarian system. But concerns about stability in the Middle East have prompted 
even some idealists in government, the media, academia and party politics to press 
for a stronger government, capable of defeating the insurgency while providing for 
the basic needs of the people.
The statist policy begins with the antithesis of idealism: a realist theory of in-
ternational politics. Of primary importance to the realist theory is the notion that 
the state is the primary actor in politics. This is based on the concept of state so-
vereignty, established in the Peace of Westphalia, which means the government 
wields control within its boundaries. Nobody else can tell a state how to run its 
internal affairs. United States Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice (2005) writes 
„The modern state system has always rested on the concept of sovereignty. It was 
assumed that states were the primary international actors.“ But now Ms. Rice claims 
2 This is the theory held by many American conservative Republicans (Will, 2004b) once raised on 
realism, and is now being embraced by Bush’s opposition party (Kennedy, 2005) and members 
of the media (Boston Globe, 2005).
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that it is a lack of state power which has resulted in threats to world peace. „To-
day, however, we have seen that these assumptions (about sovereignty) no longer 
hold, and as a result, the greatest threats to our security are deﬁned more by the 
dynamics within weak and failing states.“3 
Despite the decision to oust an authoritarian leader in Iraq, many seem to cla-
mor for the return of someone like Saddam Hussein (Viorst, 2004; Niskanen, 2006). 
Others call for „the Egyptian Model,“ where a pro-West leader uses authoritarian 
tactics to stabilize Iraq (White, 2003; Karon, 2004). Some see the former prime 
minister of Iraq, Iyad Allawi, as the type of strongman who would be a new Hosni 
Mubarak (Clift, 2004; Karon, 2004, Moubayed, 2005). Eventually, some statist sup-
porters hope that the strongman will impose liberal values such as property rights 
and the rule of law (Pipes, 2003; Karon, 2004; Boot, 2005; Moubayed, 2005).4 
Not all strongman government policies involve support for imposing a free 
market policy on a country. Some call for the state to provide a series of public 
goods, ranging from law and order and protection to basic services such as utilities 
and employment (National Security Council, 2005; Kennedy, 2005). Other options 
seek a bigger role for the government in the economy, often using the term „ef-
fective institutions“ to buttress their argument (Rodrik, 2004) These institutions 
allow a greater control over the economy by the government (Rodrik, 2004). Al-
Saadi (2004) criticizes economic liberalization plans for Iraq, calling for increased 
taxes from private businesses, rather than sole reliance on oil revenues, to ﬁnance 
government policies such as a welfare state. 
Supporters of the „Strong State Theory“ would clearly disagree with the no-
tion of opening institutions to the public, or weakening state power vis-à-vis its 
citizenry. For them, too much participation in a regime can overload a state’s ca-
pacity to handle all of these demands, particularly if it is a new regime. Instead, a 
government must prove to its population that can provide a steady hand, domi-
nating a country’s politics and economics. The former is important, especially in a 
country beset by societal divisions, for left to their own devices, the result might 
involve sectarian violence. The latter is key because any government, especially a 
young one, must provide for the needs of its people. With a weak state incapab-
le of developing much in the way of revenue via taxation or delivering the basic 
needs to its people, will dissolve into chaos and war.
3 This is interesting, given that two of the remaining „Axis of Evil“ members, North Korea and 
Iran, are countries run by powerful governments.
4 How will Iraqis respond? Laith Kubba of the National Endowment for Democracy claims 
„By and large, Iraqis are accustomed to a strong state (PBS Online News Hour, 2004).”
8 A Variety of Visions For The Post-9/11 State: Which Is Most Capable Of Reducing Internal Conﬂict? 
Strong State Theory: The more a country’s government controls its population, the 
more stable its state and society are.
There are two means of shoring up government control of a country. The ﬁrst 
is to clamp down on divisiveness that is generated through political activity, whe-
re groups attempt to control the process to further their own selﬁsh ends. But a 
well-regulated political arena forestalls the ability of factions to hijack the political 
process, otherwise plunging the country into chaos. Strong leadership is needed to 
produce an orderly society, to clamp down when a rebellion seems to be in the ma-
king. A leader’s ﬁrm handle on the reins of power also provides unity in a country’s 
political mission, facilitating ease in policymaking, as opposed to the gridlock that 
might exist if relatively coequal branches of power tug in different directions, or 
if locals refuse to implement the national government’s mission. Furthermore, by 
controlling who may run for ofﬁce and how successors are chosen, a country can 
manage to keep leadership in competent hands, as opposed to those who merely 
seek ofﬁce for purposes other than the national interest.
Autocracy Hypothesis: An increase in a country’s government control over the poli-
tical system is more likely to lead to a decrease in internal conﬂict.
Controlling a country’s political processes may not be enough; after all, it takes 
money to run a powerful government. A state which cannot raise the necessary 
funds to provide such control will soon face unmet demands from the population. 
To justify limited participation in politics, the basic needs of the citizenry must 
be realized. This is especially important when a new government is being formed. 
During the rough transition from the status quo ante, the turmoil is likely to pro-
duce economic dislocations. As a result, supply lines may well be disrupted. Many 
people will lack the incomes necessary to provide for themselves and their families, 
in terms of food, fuel, and funds for other purchases. A strong state control over 
the economy is needed to take the extra amounts from the haves, in order to meet 
the needs of the have nots. In addition to meeting the economic necessities of the 
people, a strong government must wield its power to plan for the future develop-
ment of its country. Such long-term economic decisions involve determining what 
a country should produce, where people’s energies must be directed, how stable 
its currency must be, etc.
Socialism Hypothesis: An increase in a country’s government control over the eco-
nomic system is more likely to lead to a decrease in internal conﬂict.
Opponents of the statist theory claim that such a vision only provides the ap-
pearance of control (Zakaria, 1997; Haass, 2003). These states fail to deliver upon 
stability, despite their projection of power. Rummel (1984) contends that in a co-
ercive society, most of what one does is controlled by government run by elites. 
 A Variety of Visions For The Post-9/11 State: Which Is Most Capable Of Reducing Internal Conﬂict? 9
An individual’s life is determined by what side he or she is on. There is the elite 
class and obey-class. Any demands for change among the obey class are harshly 
dealt with by the elites. Elites also jockey for power, creating additional sources of 
instability (Rummel, 1984).
This „class warfare“ in the Middle East has played itself out in a battle bet-
ween the government and religion. As the authoritarian state banned all forms of 
political activity, save the mosque, resistance to the regime became injected with 
religious zeal (Zakaria, 2003). The result was less stability in the Middle East, with 
jihad as the norm. Eland (2006) points out that such authoritarianism has failed 
in Iraq as well, blaming government policies for the problems. 
Critics of the statist approach also highlight problems with government domi-
nation of the economy. Rummel (1984) argues that dictatorial domination of eco-
nomic freedom is just as bad as political authoritarianism. Gartzke (2005) contends 
that strategies whereby governments attempt to control territory by force may have 
worked when the land had value (agriculture and early manufacturing), but modern 
wealth is not always based upon real estate. Capital can ﬂee adverse policies, while 
policing territory is more likely to drain a state’s coffers than ﬁll them. 
Though the Bush Administration may be tilting toward a political authorita-
rian, his National Security Council (2005) issued many criticisms of Saddam’s ﬁs-
cal policies. And Looney (2005) found Saddam’s policies not so much controlling 
as they were ineffective. The heavy infusion of both oil wealth and the American 
government’s foreign aid into the state treasury after Saddam’s rule has not see-
med to make the new Iraqi regime more effective (Zakaria, 2005).
The Case For A Libertarian State
Though freedom is frequently mentioned by other visions, neither provides much in 
the way of restrictions on how a government (however chosen) treats its citizens. 
Zakaria (1997) labels this „constitutional liberalism“ and focuses on state outputs, 
not inputs. He focuses on the legal elements of a state’s obligations, restricting its 
actions towards its governed (Zakaria, 2005).5 There is also an economic component 
to the liberties provided and protected by the state, according to Zakaria (2002).
5 In fact, the term „rule of law“ is often bandied about by all three visions. But there is a 
misunderstanding about the relationship between legal obligations and their implementation. 
A government that passes laws and imposes them on society is engaging in „rule by law.“ 
But when a government is subject to the same laws it develops, limited in its actions by these 
hurdles, as well as its ability to rewrite the law, then „rule of law“ is said to exist (Tamahana, 
2004). Furthermore, an independent judiciary must be able to hold the state accountable, with 
its decisions respected, not ignored (Tamahana, 2004).
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How does libertarianism contribute to peace? According to Gwartney and 
Lawson (2005), economic freedom and civil liberties share a bond, as well a posi-
tive correlation with political stability. These measures of liberty are related to a 
wide variety of positive measures of prosperity and quality of life measures (Tures, 
2005a). Gartzke (2005) ﬁnds that economic liberty is associated with a reduction 
in international violence. He contends that free markets encourage cooperation 
and provide another venue for competition. They also act as a sounding board for 
political activity, while actions that depress the market and investment are avoi-
ded by regimes (Gartzke, 2005). Rummel (1984) ﬁnds a link between freedom (in 
terms of civil liberties, political rights, and economic freedom) and a reduction in 
internal violence. This is because a free society is relatively pluralistic. This leads to 
cross-pressure interests and wills. In other words, people don’t ﬁght, but bargain 
with each other, in a free society (Rummel, 1984).
According to those who subscribe to the libertarian theory, it is ironic that the 
United States would support the spread of democracy around the world, when so 
much of the American constitution is „undemocratic (Zakaria, 1997; Garmong, 
2003; Eland, 2005).“ Such arguments in favor of granting civil and economic li-
berties are also relevant for the Iraqi case. In explaining Iraq’s instability, Eland 
(2006) claims „Minimizing or eliminating the central government would eliminate 
the fear by Iraqi groups that the central government would be taken over by one 
group and used to oppress all others.“6 As Zakaria (2003) points out „we want to 
bring to Iraq not just democracy, but liberal democracy.“7 
Despite their differences, both the participatory and strong state theories share 
a common factor: both offer a prominent position for government. The former seeks 
to enhance public control over the state to further the ability for elected leaders 
to accomplish their goals. And the latter seeks a powerful, though more insular, 
government, capable of controlling the political and economic spheres.
6 These have application elsewhere in the Middle East. Haass (2003) cites the need to prepare 
the citizenry for election via civil liberties, citing the recent example of Bahrain. On the other 
hand, Algeria rushed elections in 1991 before liberalization, producing a sad outcome.
7 The plan for victory in Iraq developed by the National Security Council (2005) does not ignore the 
role of civil liberties and economic freedoms. As noted earlier, planners called for „rule of law“ 
(however imperfectly evaluated). The National Security Council (2005) did call for measuring the 
number of businesses opened, commercial law reforms, and changes in the bureaucracy. They 
recommend opening a stock market and developing a stable currency (though one is unsure 
whether 1,475 dinars to the dollar is „stable.“ But most of these indicators are macroeconomic 
factors, ranging from GDP to oil production. These factors do not explain how free the economy 
operates apart from government policies, nor do they cover how accountable the regime will 
be in ensuring it will not meddle in commercial affairs.
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Not all believe that so much power should be handed to a government. This 
school of thought assumes that state power is the source of conﬂict, not the cure. 
Whether chosen by election or selection, a government is more likely to take po-
wer from individuals, breeding resentment at this outside intrusion into people’s 
personal lives. A state also wields coercive power, which is frequently brought to 
bear upon the population in order to produce compliance with its wishes. Citizens 
often respond to the presence of legitimated violence with their own brand of 
hostility, generating instability in a power struggle between the government and 
the governed.
Libertarians argue that it is the state power that is the source of conﬂict. Whe-
ther chosen by voters or other means, the winners use the political ofﬁce to reward 
themselves and their supporters, as a means of staying in power. This means the 
political in-group raises taxes on the rest of the population to pay for the winning 
coalition’s pet projects, or even personal gain. In a similar manner, laws are passed 
on the population, empowering the political „haves“ over the political „have-nots.“ 
In order to keep a grip on power, some of the revenue is allocated toward a mi-
litary and police to enforce the laws and forestall dissent with such policies. The 
political out-group faces higher taxes, more regulation, and unfair laws enforced 
by coercive elements. Facing the whim of a state’s arbitrary actions, the political 
losers seem to have little option other than rebelling against the government ap-
paratus or ﬁghting the political winning group.
Libertarian Theory: The freer a country’s citizenry is, the more stable its state and 
society is.
Typically, when a new government is formed, especially one implemented by 
a Western power such as the United States, freedom is noted as a deﬁning cha-
racteristic. But a closer examination of how the term is implemented reveals that 
liberty is couched in terms of political rights and electoral freedoms: the ability to 
choose one’s leaders and possibly vote on a series of policies. Supporters of such 
freedoms label these as „positive rights,“ noting that these provide people with 
something they can do. Other rights are often designated with the pejorative „ne-
gative rights“ label (implying that they do not play a constructive role in society). 
These deal with restrictions or what cannot be done in a society.
But supporters of civil liberties might note that these „negative“ rights are not 
counterproductive at all. Rather, they forestall the government from encroaching 
upon the basic freedoms of individuals. Governments are held accountable for de-
priving individuals of their liberties. But this means that people can speak freely, 
assemble, write what they want, worship who they want and own what they want, 
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which hardly seems like a pessimistic connotation for the average citizen. Only the 
government is limited in what it can do. In such a „positive“ world, citizens have 
no quarrel with their respective regime, and therefore have less incentive to wage 
a domestic conﬂict with their government.
Civil Liberties Hypothesis: An increase in a country’s respect for civil liberties is more 
likely to lead to a decrease in internal conﬂict.
Just as a libertarian government is blocked from taking the civil liberties of 
the public, it is equally checked from taking the economic freedoms from the po-
pulation. In such a society, people can own property which cannot be taken by the 
government. They can trade with whomever they want, buy and sell whatever they 
want, hire and ﬁre whoever they want, and set their own wages for their workers. 
Similarly workers can determine where they want to work and negotiate a fair pri-
ce for their labor. A greater level of economic competition is apt to produce lower 
prices. Supporters of this theory claim that their system is more efﬁcient becau-
se the government extracts fewer resources from the population to serve its own 
selﬁsh or corrupt needs. Furthermore, a more economically free society has fewer 
regulations that serve either non-economic needs or the purposes of those with a 
political motivation for their economic laws. Not only is a more economically pro-
ductive system less likely to have a need to resort to violence (people are making 
too much money to ﬁght), but there is a greater feeling that the citizen’s economy 
is „theirs.“ Destroying an item one owns seems relatively counterproductive. There 
is also less of a need to expend the expensive resources necessary to acquire goods 
by force if they can be purchased more cheaply on an open marketplace of goods, 
to borrow an idea from Joseph Schumpeter (1919).
Capitalism Hypothesis: An increase in a country’s respect for economic freedoms is 
more likely to lead to a decrease in internal conﬂict.
This theory is not without its critics. Foes of the libertarian theory believe that 
if people with sharp differences are allowed to publicly express themselves and 
their opinions, a war of words over these variations of beliefs will spill over into 
violence. If governments are restrained from heavily regulating personal behavior, 
terrorists and insurgents may be able to take advantage of such rights to carry out 
their campaign of violence. The fears are that a weakened government will not be 
effective enough to defeat a determined insurgency (Zakaria, 1997; Will, 2004a), 
which can hide behind protections of civil liberties that limit state power.
In a capitalist society, two groups could emerge: the „haves“ and the „have-
nots.“ The economic „losers,“ deprived of government transfers of wealth, are likely 
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to ﬁght the „winners“ for commercial resources and markets. And a government 
with a smaller tax revenue is less likely to muster the military and police forces 
necessary to protect the private property of individuals. Less state funds also means 
fewer courts capable of resolving disputes between private individuals, or even 
between citizens and their governments.
Libertarian theory supporters have also been assailed by defenders of democracy 
for being too critical of free and fair elections, as well as attempts to replace nasty 
authoritarians with well-intentioned systems that provide political rights (White 
House, 2004b; Rummel 2005a; 2005b; Zakaria, 2005). 
Three separate notions for the provision of stability offer a variety of choices 
for the policymaker. But which do the best job of mitigating the internal violence 
that might tear a country apart? The ability to test these arguments needs greater 
speciﬁcation.
Research Design
In order to examine these hypotheses, additional details on the factors to be ana-
lyzed must be incorporated. This means further specifying the independent and 
dependent variables, control variables, the spatial-temporal domain, and method 
of empirical analysis.
Dependent Variable: Internal Conﬂict
If the goal for a country is to produce stability, it helps to examine those cases 
where instability is the greatest, which serve as the dependent variable or variable 
to be explained in our analysis. When armed resistance threatens the very existence 
of the country, producing the greatest loss of life and destruction of property, in-
stability is at its peak. This disrupts the political and economic fabric of society in 
a way that lower forms of instability (political gridlock and economic recessions) 
are clearly subordinate. 
Scholars from the Centre for the Study of Civil War at the International Peace 
Research Institute at Oslo (PRIO) and the Department of Peace and Conﬂict Stu-
dies at Uppsala University have collected data on a number of cases where internal 
ﬁghting occurs (Gleditsch et.al., 2002). This dataset, called the Armed Conﬂict Da-
tabase, deﬁnes conﬂict as „a contested incompatibility that concerns government 
and/or territory where the use of armed force between two parties, of which at 
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least one is the government of a state, results in at least 25 battle-related deaths 
(Gleditsch et.al., 2002).“ The PRIO-Uppsala dataset has even classiﬁed several le-
vels of violence within a country’s borders. These range from the lowest levels of 
combat (internal minor conﬂicts) to the highest levels of hostility (internal war), 
with an intermediate level of internal conﬂict incorporated as well.8 This dataset 
is employed in our analysis of the internal instability of a country.
In addition to several levels of violence, there are also quantiﬁable differences 
in the characteristics of insurgencies or domestic conﬂicts. For example, a country 
may experience several conﬂicts within their boundaries at a given time, and these 
may vary in the level of intensity. To satisfy those who claim that the overall level 
of violence matters, versus those who point out that a diverse array of internal con-
ﬂicts is „more taxing“ for a country, two sets of internal conﬂicts are analyzed. 
The ﬁrst set of measures, which is dichotomous, simply notes whether the 
country in question is the victim of an internal conﬂict for a given year. It also 
focuses on whether any internal conﬂict has occurred in that country for that 
year. Separate variables code whether or not an internal war has occurred in that 
country in a particular year, whether or not an internal intermediate conﬂict has 
occurred in that country for that time period, and whether or not an internal mi-
nor conﬂict emerges in that particular country-year. The second set of measure is 
a continuous number, which counts how many internal wars a country suffers in a 
given year, how many internal intermediate conﬂicts happen in a country’s parti-
cular year, and how many internal minor conﬂicts may pop up in a country for the 
year in question. In addition to these separate variables, a measure which counts 
all internal conﬂicts inﬂicted upon a country for a certain year is incorporated into 
this analysis as a separate variable. 
Independent Variables
In our analysis, a set of independent (or explanatory) variables are to be incorpo-
rated in our model. These are based upon concepts from the various hypotheses 
derived from the participatory, statist and libertarian theories articulated in the 
previous section. Two variables from each theory will be incorporated into our 
analyses of internal conﬂict.
8 Conﬂict intensity is regarded as a function of casualties in the internal instability. Internal minor 
conﬂicts have at least 25 battle-dead per year. Intermediate internal conﬂicts have more than 
25 battle-dead per year and a total history of 1000 battle-related deaths, but fewer than 1,000 
per year. Internal wars have at least 1,000 battle dead annually (Gleditsch et.al., 2002).
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Participation Theory
The ﬁrst hypothesis derived from the participatory theory contends that an increa-
se in a country’s political rights will reduce the level of internal conﬂict a country 
experiences. These political rights measure how much input the public has in the 
selection of its leaders, policies, it’s right to form parties, minority self-determi-
nation, and otherwise stay active in the political process. Such data is provided by 
the Freedom House measure of political rights. It is measured on a scale of 1 th-
rough 7, with the former involving a greater level of political rights, while scores 
closer to a seven indicate great restrictions on the ability of people to participate 
in politics within that country for a particular year. So as the score for political 
rights „increases“ to a seven, we should expect a higher level of internal violence, 
according to the hypothesis.9 
As for the democracy hypothesis, it is argued by supporters that if the public 
has a greater control over the government institutions, instability within a country 
should be reduced. This concept of public penetration of government is best pro-
vided by the democracy scale collected by the researcher for Polity IVd (Beardsley 
and Gleditsch, 2003).10 This variable assigns a score determined on the following 
factors: (a) the regulation of executive recruitment (institutionalized procedures 
regarding the transfer of executive power), (b) the competitiveness of executive 
recruitment (the extent to which executives are chosen through competitive elec-
tions), (c) openness of executive recruitment (opportunity for non-elites to attain 
executive ofﬁce), (d) executive constraints (operational or de facto independence 
of the chief executive), (e) regulation of participation (development of institutional 
structures for political expression), and (f) competitiveness of participation (the 
extent to which non-elites are able to access institutional structures for political 
expression). The more decentralized political systems have higher democracy scores 
on a scale of 0-10, while lower scores reﬂect less control of political institutions 
by the citizenry. If the democracy hypothesis is supported by the evidence, then 
higher democracy scores will lead to less internal conﬂict.
9 The Freedom House data is based upon a survey methodology by Raymond Gastil using a checklist 
and point system. „To answer the political questions, Freedom House considers to what extent 
the system offers voters the opportunity to choose freely from among candidates, and to what 
extent the candidates are chosen independently of the state (Freedom House, 2003).”
10 Polity IVd differs slightly from Polity IV in that Beardsley and Gleditsch converted the Marshall 
and Jaggers (2003) data from the country-year format to the polity case format.
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Strong State Theory
Polity IVd is also employed in our analysis of the statist theory, which contends a 
strong government is needed for stability. Another measure provided by the re-
searchers, dubbed „autocracy,“ involves coder input on how much control a chief 
executive has over the political process (can they select their own successor, can 
they control who gets on the ballot, are they constrained by a constitution, can 
they regulate participation, can they direct local governments). It should be noted 
that while the democracy and autocracy variables collect similar information, they 
are not pure inverses of each other. They measure slightly different (yet related) 
factors, and assign different weights. Like the democracy variable, however, auto-
cracy is measured by an eleven-point scale. Higher autocracy scores will generate 
less internal conﬂict, on average, if the autocracy hypothesis is supported.
 
But control over the political process is only one method of state control to ensure 
stability. The other, as noted in the socialist hypothesis, contends that a greater level 
of government control over the economy is more likely to reduce internal conﬂict. 
The Fraser Institute’s dataset Economic Freedom of the World (EFW) collects data 
on many countries, including the size of government, the country’s court system, 
access to sound money, regulations on foreign exchange, and regulations on credit, 
labor and business. The EFW dataset summarizes the data in a 0-10 scale. Countries 
with higher scores are more economically free. Countries with lower EFW scores 
have greater levels of state control over the economy, and therefore have lower 
levels of internal conﬂict, according to the socialist hypothesis.
 
Libertarian Theory
The ﬁnal theory in our analysis contends that an increase in political and economic 
freedom is the best route to stability for a country. The former hypothesis contends 
that a country which does a better job of respecting the civil liberties of its citizens 
fares better in reducing internal conﬂict. To gauge restrictions on the ability of a 
government to deprive its citizens of the freedoms, Freedom House’s civil liberties 
index is employed. Like their political rights measure, it is coded on a seven-point 
scale. The higher the number, the more likely a state will encroach on the rights of 
the people, ranging from freedoms of assembly, speech, press, movement, as well as 
protections against arbitrary search and seizures by the government. It also deals 
with the rule of law, not only gauged by the presence of an independent judiciary, 
but equal treatment of the population under the law, a police under civilian con-
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trol, and „protection from police terror, unjustiﬁed imprisonment, exile or torture 
(Freedom House, 2003).“11 Lower scores indicate more restrictions on a regime’s 
ability to deprive the public of its rights.
Like the socialist hypothesis, the capitalist hypothesis also uses the ten-point 
scale adopted by the Fraser Institute. Countries where the citizens have greater 
protection of their property rights, monetary and commercial freedom, the ability 
to hire and set wages independent of government intrusion are more likely to have 
economic freedom, according to the EFW dataset. Countries with scores closer to 
ten are judged by analysts to have more economic freedom, while lower scores 
indicate a heavier presence of government control over the economy. The former 
reduces internal conﬂict while the latter enhances it, according to the capitalist 
hypothesis.
Control Variables
Such an analysis should examine whether development plays a more important 
role in reducing violence. Wealthier states or countries with higher quality of life 
may have less ﬁghting because the population is more satisﬁed, irrespective of 
their regime type.
Two control variables for development are employed. The ﬁrst is economic de-
velopment, which is measured by the Penn World Tables (6.1) using the indicator 
„Real GDP Per Capita, Purchasing Power Parity, in Constant Dollars, using the Chain 
Index.“ This provides a measure of economic health of a country which is relatively 
standardized in comparison to that of other countries, controlling for that country’s 
population, and is not as affected by inﬂation.
The other measure captures a country’s „human development,“ by focusing 
on the quality of life experienced by the citizens. Collected by the United Nati-
ons, the Human Development Indicators includes a country’s GDP (in terms of a 
standardized score), the literacy rate of the population, and the life expectancy of 
individuals. When the populace has a strong market, the people are educated and 
can expect a longer life, the chances for violence in that country are likely to be 
greatly reduced.
11 Civil liberties are also gathered by Freedom House. But there is a key difference between it and 
the Political Rights data. „In answering the civil liberties questions, Freedom House does not 
equate constitutional guarantees of human rights with the on-the-ground fulﬁllment of these 
rights (Freedom House, 2003).“ In other words, these data on civil liberties are based on more 
than paper guarantees.
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Case Selection Mechanism
In this analysis, we look at a pool of countries collected by the EFW dataset (appro-
ximately 125 countries). This study uses the country-year as the unit of analysis, 
such as Honduras for 2001. Data on all of the variables is taken for all of the years 
available (1970, 1975, 1980, 1985, 1990, 1995, 1997, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, and 
2003). Using these standards provides 983 cases.
Empirical Analysis
To test the six hypotheses as well as the impact of the control variables, I use the 
standard regression model, which examines the impact of the slope coefﬁcients of 
the independent variables upon the values of the dependent variable. This includes 
models where internal conﬂict is a continuous variable, as well as a dichotomous 
variable. The tables report the direction of the relationship, as well as its statisti-
cal signiﬁcance. This is determined by the t-ratio derived from the division of the 
slope coefﬁcient by the standard error. A signiﬁcant relationship is determined by 
the ability to reject the null hypothesis that there is no relationship between the 
variables. For example, if we ﬁnd that the political rights hypothesis is „statistically 
signiﬁcant,“ this indicates that we can reject the null hypothesis that a country’s 
provision of political rights is unrelated to internal conﬂict. This does not consti-
tute „absolute proof“ that the provision of political rights guarantees an absence 
of violence, but it rejects the argument that these factors have no connection. 
Results
In the examination of the three theories and their ties to instability, the results 
of the continuous variable measure of internal conﬂict (counting the number of 
internal conﬂicts in a country-year) are reported. If there are any discrepancies 
between these results and the results of the test using the dichotomous variable 
of internal conﬂict (whether or not a conﬂict has occurred in a country in a given 
year), they are noted as well.12 
12 In an exchange with Gartzke (2005), Rummel (2005b) contends that multicollinearity is a 
problem for regression models. He argues that it is economic freedom would steal democracy’s 
thunder, given that the two variables tend to be highly correlated. However, it is unclear why 
one independent variable would remain statistically signiﬁcant while the other would not, if 
bias was affecting both measures (in other words, neither would be statistically signiﬁcant). 
Furthermore, it does not explain why the civil liberties measure would be statistically signiﬁcant, 
even with multicollinearity bias, but political rights and democracy would not be.
 A Variety of Visions For The Post-9/11 State: Which Is Most Capable Of Reducing Internal Conﬂict? 19
When analyzing all cases of internal conﬂict, there is little support for the 
Participation Theory. The political freedom measure is not statistically signiﬁcant. 
A test of the democracy hypothesis reveals that countries with higher democra-
cy scores are more likely, on average, to experience more internal conﬂicts. This 
same measure, however, is not statistically when the dependent variable is coded 
as a dummy variable. A test of the Strong State Theory when all internal conﬂicts 
reveals mixed support. Higher scores on the autocracy measures reduce internal 
conﬂict. But the socialism variable exacerbates internal conﬂict. The Libertarian 
Theory performs quite well in the test involving all internal conﬂicts. Both the ci-
vil liberties and economic freedom variables are found to reduce the amount of 
internal conﬂict a country experiences. Neither control variable was found to be 
statistically signiﬁcant.
When internal wars, the most severe form of instability, act as the dependent 
variable, there is still no support for either hypothesis derived from the Participation 
Theory; neither political freedom nor democracy is found to be statistically signi-
ﬁcant in their relationship with internal wars. As with all internal conﬂicts, there 
is mixed support for the Strong State Theory. Again, autocracy is found to dampen 
internal wars, while socialism seems to facilitate the presence of an internal war. 
The Libertarian Theory is strongly supported when internal wars are considered; a 
government’s respect for civil liberties and economic freedom, on average, tends 
to reduce the most severe forms of internal conﬂict.
When internal intermediate conﬂicts are considered as the dependent variable, 
the results mimic those of internal wars. Neither the Freedom House measure of 
political rights, nor the Polity IVd measure of democracy is statistically signiﬁcant. 
Polity IVd’s autocracy measure, however, was negatively related to internal inter-
mediate conﬂict; a greater government control over the political process tends to 
produce less internal conﬂict. A state’s domination of the economy was found to 
have the opposite effect, though. As with internal wars, the Libertarian Theory sho-
wed the greatest ability to reduce internal intermediate conﬂict. Both the Freedom 
House measure of civil liberties and the Fraser Institute’s measure of economic 
freedoms often kept a lid on moderate levels of internal conﬂict.
Tests using internal minor conﬂicts as the dependent variable show the gre-
atest discrepancies with results from other measures of internal conﬂict. Again, 
the participatory theory performs poorly as a means of reducing instability. Not 
only is political freedom unrelated to the presence of internal minor conﬂicts, 
but democracy is actually more likely to generate these conﬂict cases. The sta-
tist theory also underperforms as a method for curbing internal violence. Unlike 
other measures of the dependent variable, autocracy often increases the number 
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of internal minor conﬂicts (the results for the dichotomous version of the internal 
conﬂict measure was not statistically signiﬁcant). The government’s control over 
the economy was unrelated to the presence or absence of internal minor conﬂict. 
Only the Libertarian Theory showed any ability to reduce internal minor conﬂict. 
Greater respect for civil liberties by authorities reduced levels of internal minor 
conﬂict, while economic freedom did not signiﬁcantly reduce the presence of the 
internal minor conﬂicts.
The preceding analysis examines the results for all countries, developed and 
developing. A legitimate question is whether or not the results apply to cases where 
only the developing countries are included. Using membership in the Organization 
for Economic Cooperation and Development as a criterion for development, sho-
wed few differences between samples of all cases, and those countries outside of 
the OECD. There are no changes in positive or negative relationship among those 
considered statistically signiﬁcant. Only one variable „loses“ statistical signiﬁcance, 
and then for only one measure of the dependent variable.13 
Analysis
Interpreting The Findings
Despite the wide variety of case selection mechanisms for developed and developing 
countries, the different means of measuring internal conﬂict, and the incorpora-
tion of control variables for multiple levels of development, there are some clear 
lessons for policymakers wishing to determine how to reducing internal instability 
within a country.
First, the expansion of political participation does not seem to reduce the pre-
sence of internal conﬂict, whether measured as the provision of political rights or 
public control over government institutions. In fact, the latter is actually associated 
with a slight increase in the occurrence of internal minor conﬂict.
13 In examining cases of all types of internal conﬂicts, the autocracy scale is not signiﬁcantly 
related to reductions in internal conﬂict, unless a dummy dependent variable of conﬂict/no 
conﬂict is employed (when the number of all internal conﬂicts in a given year are considered, 
autocracy does not reduce these internal conﬂicts).
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Second, producing a strong state tends to have a mixed impact upon greater 
stability within a country. Political centralization appears to be effective overall 
in reducing severe and moderate conﬂicts, but not the overall amount of conﬂict 
(when non-OECD countries are considered), given its positive association with the 
presence of minor-level conﬂict (even when all cases are examined). Greater state 
control over the economic realm actually increases the likelihood of an internal 
war and intermediate level conﬂict.
Third, ensuring that the state does not encroach upon the political and economic 
liberties of its citizens appears to have a positive role in the reduction of domestic 
disputes. Protecting against the encroachment of civil liberties was the only factor 
that consistently reduced every form of internal conﬂict measured, across all forms 
of case selections. And economic freedom played an important role in reducing the 
chances for a war or intermediate-level conﬂict within the country.
Future Directions
Though this research represents a good start in the analysis of the relationship bet-
ween a regime and stability as measured by internal conﬂict, but there is room for 
future studies to be conducted. First, there are a number of countries which have 
been excluded from the analysis on the basis of data available. Many of these tend 
to be run by governments with highly centralized control over their internal politics 
and economics. Should the data become available to analyze these cases, we might 
ﬁnd that their incorporation may further weaken the „Strong State Theory.“ The 
impact of the results is as yet unclear for the Political Participation Theory, given 
its poor showing in the current analysis, along with the knowledge that some of 
the omitted countries (such as those excluded East European countries) have mass 
suffrage. But the incorporation of these missing countries could further strengthen 
the Libertarian Theory, which already demonstrated an ability to account for a re-
duction in in ternal conﬂict (especially its most severe cases).
But there are other changes that could be included as well in additional research. 
First, the data was collected for those countries when it was available. Others have 
chosen to interpolate the data for the gaps as a means of testing the theory upon 
many more cases. Another change might be in an examination of the „socialist 
hypothesis.“ Rather than rely upon the same EFW data employed to examine eco-
nomic freedom, a different measure could be adopted, such as the percentage of 
a country’s gross domestic product devoted to government spending. Though such 
data does exist, ﬁnding reliable consistent data for the years 1970 through 2003, 
will pose a challenge for future research.
22 A Variety of Visions For The Post-9/11 State: Which Is Most Capable Of Reducing Internal Conﬂict? 
Conclusion
In his goals for stability in the Middle East, the President and his foreign policy 
team has elected to focus on a strategy of rushing democracy to the conquered 
countries upon the assumption that such states are more peaceful, supporting this 
assertion with an analysis of external wars, ignoring internal conﬂicts. Likewise, 
critics have harped upon the lack of stability in these nascent regimes, insisting 
that a stronger state is necessary.
At the same time, both seem wedded to the idea that the solution is more 
government. The Bush Administration frequently calls for freedom in Iraq, but its 
interpretation of what that means is nearly exclusively meant to include electoral 
rights: the right to form a political party, the right to run as a candidate, the right 
to vote, and the right for the winners to write a constitution that will guarantee 
future freedoms to vote.14 Little is said about what goes into the constitution, what 
policies might be passed, and how to ensure that a government won’t deprive ci-
tizens of the civil and economic liberties.
Results here conﬁrm the relative shortcomings of fomenting only voting rights 
as a means of reducing internal conﬂicts. In fact, democracy is even associated with 
an increase in lower levels of such ﬁghting. The ﬁndings also show that generating 
a strong government capable of dominating the political process as well as the eco-
nomy is not always the most effective strategy. While authoritarian regimes seem 
to have some luck in lowering the incidence of internal war and moderate forms 
of conﬂict, they do not signiﬁcantly reduce all conﬂicts when developing countries 
are the sample. And tightening government restraints over the economy seems to 
facilitate the very civil wars and conﬂicts that the regime seeks to avoid.
Instead, what may best beneﬁt the people of Iraq and Afghanistan is not the 
sticky purple dye signifying a vote or a return to Saddam Hussein-type rule for the 
former or Afghan monarchy in the case of the latter. Ballots alone do not strike 
down bullets. Holding several rounds of elections in each country has not brought 
happiness. In fact, they probably only served to underscore the futility of the de-
mocratic process, given the greater emphasis on elections then, let’s say, electricity. 
15 Furthermore, some scholars (Bueno de Mesquita and Downs, 2004) ﬁnd that the United States 
does a poor job of implementing democracy abroad when military force is employed. Though 
my own research (Tures, 2005b; 2006) is more optimistic, the results are relatively mixed.
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And only an ignorant member of the media would characterize Saddam Hussein’s 
rule (or the Afghan king’s regime) as stable, or even insurgency-free.15 
The Afghanis and Iraqis, like so many other people in the world, don’t wish 
for more government, even if they are allowed a small part of it. What the peo-
ple do seem to appreciate, however, is the ability to manage their lives, free from 
the interference of others, especially a powerful government.16 For how free is a 
society if a democratically-elected government can take away the rights of those 
who lost the election, or even members of the public who voted for the winning 
elite group?
Analysis of the data across a number of countries and contexts who have ex-
perienced the absence or presence of internal conﬂict, in a variety of forms, has 
conﬁrmed that countries which have governments that respect the civil liberties 
and economic freedoms of its citizens are less likely to have domestic conﬂict, es-
pecially the most severe forms of civil wars and insurgencies. Less support exists 
for having a highly participatory political system or a strong state. And though it 
may be difﬁcult for the Bush Administration and its critics to swallow this hard 
truth, ignoring this lesson could spell disaster for America’s attempts to bring sta-
bility to the Middle East.
15 Noted democratic peace scholar Rudolph J. Rummel (2005a) offers a more positive appraisal 
of the situation in both countries, calling Afghanistan as a democracy and Iraq as well on its 
way to democracy. Freedom House (2006) offers a less supportive assessment of the democratic 
credentials of both. Afghanistan’s 2002 rating changed little from their 2001 rating (a seven 
on the political rights and civil liberties scale each). This improved by a point on each scale in 
2003, and maintained that status for 2004. Afghanistan successfully lowered their political 
rights score to a ﬁve in 2005. But for every year since 2001, the country has maintained an 
overall rating of „Not Free.“ Like Afghanistan, Iraq began their year of occupation in 2003 with 
the worst scores for political rights and civil liberties (a seven on each) thanks to the Hussein 
regime. Civil liberties did improve in the country as this score was revised to a ﬁve in 2004. 
However, not only did Iraq fail to improve their scores the following year, but they received a 
„downward trend“ arrow for 2005, „due to an increase in violence and a lack of general security 
(Freedom House, 2006).“ Furthermore, the country received the lowest rating of „Not Free“ for 
2003, 2004 and 2005. Other scores from other datasets used in this study do not have data for 
either country after 2003 at this time.
16 Though there is no ofﬁcial ranking for Iraq in the postwar years, early signs may be troubling. 
According to Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index for 2004, Iraq is ranked 
129th. out of 145 countries, behind Sudan, Yemen, Libya and Lebanon (Transparency International, 
2004). Looney’s (2005) forecast for the future of corruption in Iraq is not very encouraging as 
well.
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Tables
 Table A Participatory Theory
 All Countries Political Rights Democracy
 Continuous Total Conﬂicts No relationship More conﬂict
 Dichotomous Total Conﬂicts No relationship No relationship
 Continuous Internal War No relationship No relationship
 Dichotomous Internal War No relationship No relationship
 Continuous Internal Intermediate Conﬂict No relationship No relationship
 Dichotomous Internal Intermediate Conﬂict No relationship No relationship
 Continuous Internal Minor Conﬂict No relationship More conﬂict
 Dichotomous Internal Minor Conﬂict No relationship More conﬂict
 Table B Strong State Theory
 All Countries Autocracy Socialism
 Continuous Total Conﬂicts Less conﬂict1 More conﬂict
 Dichotomous Total Conﬂicts Less conﬂict More conﬂict
 Continuous Internal War Less conﬂict More conﬂict
 Dichotomous Internal War Less conﬂict More conﬂict
 Continuous Internal Intermediate Conﬂict Less conﬂict More conﬂict
 Dichotomous Internal Intermediate Conﬂict Less conﬂict More conﬂict
 Continuous Internal Minor Conﬂict More conﬂict2 No relationship
 Dichotomous Internal Minor Conﬂict No relationship No relationship
1 = In examining cases of all types of internal conﬂicts, the autocracy scale is not signiﬁcantly  
 related to reductions in internal conﬂict for non-OECD countries, unless a dummy dependent  
 variable of conﬂict/no conﬂict is employed.
2 = For non-OECD countries, the positive relationship between autocracy and the increase in  
 internal minor conﬂicts is only statistically signiﬁcant at the .10 level.
 A Variety of Visions For The Post-9/11 State: Which Is Most Capable Of Reducing Internal Conﬂict? 25
 Table C Libertarian Theory
 All Countries Civil Liberties Capitalism
 Continuous Total Conﬂicts Less conﬂict Less conﬂict
 Dichotomous Total Conﬂicts Less conﬂict Less conﬂict
 Continuous Internal War Less conﬂict Less conﬂict
 Dichotomous Internal War Less conﬂict Less conﬂict
 Continuous Internal Intermediate Conﬂict Less conﬂict Less conﬂict3
 Dichotomous Internal Intermediate Conﬂict Less conﬂict Less conﬂict
 Continuous Internal Minor Conﬂict Less conﬂict4 No relationship
 Dichotomous Internal Minor Conﬂict Less conﬂict5 No relationship
3 = The economic freedom measure still reduces internal intermediate conﬂicts for non-OECD 
countries, but the null hypothesis can only be rejected at the .10 level, meaning that we can 
only be 90 % conﬁdent that there is a relationship between economic freedom and lower  
levels of internal intermediate conﬂict.  
4&5 = For non-OECD countries the measure of civil liberties is slightly weaker in its ability to 
account for the reduction of internal minor conﬂicts.
 Table D Control Variables
 All Countries Economic Development Human Development
 Continuous Total Conﬂicts No relationship No relationship
 Dichotomous Total Conﬂicts No relationship No relationship
 Continuous Internal War No relationship More conﬂict
 Dichotomous Internal War No relationship More conﬂict
 Continuous Internal 
 Intermediate Conﬂict No relationship More conﬂict
 Dichotomous Internal  
 Intermediate Conﬂict No relationship More conﬂict
 Continuous Internal Minor Conﬂict No relationship Less conﬂict
 Dichotomous Internal Minor Conﬂict No relationship Less conﬂict
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